BORDER RURAL COMMITTEE

STRATEGIC PLAN 2022-2027

'Poverty is not an accident. Like slavery and apartheid, it is man–made and can be removed by the actions of human beings."

Nelson Mandela

Our Mission Statement

To promote self-reliance and democratic citizenship through the implementation of rights-based development focusing on land and agrarian reform, advancement of rural livelihoods, equitable gender relations, and environmental sustainability.

Our Vision Statement

Self-sustaining rural communities free from poverty, inequality, and unemployment

Our Values

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01 Integrity and Honesty

02 Transparency and Accountability

03 Environmental and Social consciousness

04 Fairness and Justice

05 Teamwork and Professionalism

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1.   Introduction by the Managing Director

BRC turns 40 years in 2022! As we implement our next six-year strategy (2022-2027), we celebrate longevity, sustenance, and endurance. Established in 1982, the organization was founded as an organization that sought to empower rural communities to resist forced removals. This was during a time in South Africa where equality before the law was a pipe dream. 40 years later, the organisation still encompasses land and human rights principles and is still very much relevant in its rural development focus.

Since BRC was established as a membership based organisation, rural struggle(s) of the Eastern Cape have shifted gears. The struggle(s) has transformed from ordinary and marginalized rural folk demanding access to land and basic human rights, to the never-ending fight against South Africa's triple challenge of poverty, inequality, unemployment – and recently the recognition of under development. Even with this shift, the transformation agenda of the country still does not deliver the basic needs of rural folk. Instead, glaring challenges include:

i.   increasing levels of abject and immediate poverty,
ii.   high levels of crime – particularly violence against women and girls (VAWG) and gender-based violence and femicide (GBVF),
iii.   unacceptably high levels of unemployment with the Eastern Cape recording the highest levels of expanded unemployment at 50%,
iv.   one of the world's highest levels of inequality both within and amongst communities of the Eastern Cape,
v.   worsening climate change realities directly affecting rural people's indigenous ways of life and a just transitions debate way removed from the grassroots,
vi.   no or little tenure of land as well as rights to use land for self or community developmental purposes.

40 years later, BRC still remains relevant in rural development as we seek to address the afore mentioned rural struggles in our work. The life span of BRC is full of successful events and the organisation still remains the go-to organisation for those rural activists and communities seeking to contribute to the development of their households and rural communities. BRC continues to contribute to the policy development arena. As an rural development organisation, BRC is ever more committed to empowering rural activists towards active citizenry. We believe that active citizenship leads to meaningful engagement between the state – at all levels and spheres - towards the realisation of implementable policies that seek to promote self-sustainability.

BRC has made a huge mark in rural development and is well known for its good work. The organisation will continue its agenda of fighting poverty and protection of rights of the rural citizen. Our new strategic plan demonstrates our commitment to this unique rural Eastern Cape development.

Phumeza Grootboom
Managing Director

2.   External Environmental Analysis

2.1. Political Factors

An overview of the current political–economic–social situation in contemporary South Africa points to the following key features:

- A stagnating economy where mass unemployment is now well over 32% of the labour force and at more than 46,3% for the youth – this translates to at least 7,2 million people (Statistics South Africa, 2021).
- The collapsing social fabric in poor and working-class communities, which is, and has been the breeding ground for the social unrest we saw after the incarceration of former President Jacob Zuma in July as well as extreme forms of violence and brutality against women and children, rising crime, gangsterism and substance abuse, xenophobic violence, and pogroms.
- A collapsing state and deteriorating services, as government departments and state-owned enterprises become more dysfunctional because of corruption and cronyism.
- Super-exploitation of employed workers in contrast to sustained profits by the very top of capitalists, and precarity for many vulnerable workers, informal workers, and a permanently unemployed masses.
- Intersecting ecological and climate crises subjecting vast parts of the country to extreme weather events such as devastating droughts, destructive storms, and floods as well as eroding air quality, soil fertility and declining freshwater resources with resulting impacts for food sovereignty and quality of health.
- Collapsing energy (especially electricity) and transport systems, which exacerbate pre-existing inequalities, deepening spatial Apartheid geographies and demographics.

These multiple and intersecting crises have worked to give rise to a political crisis, at the heart of which is the erosion of popular progressive consciousness and widespread disillusionment and lack of hope amongst the impoverished majority. Under these pressures, South Africa's rich tradition of popular social movements and working-class solidarity have declined. Existing trade unions and social movements are fragmenting and struggling to effectively represent the interests of their constituencies. Yet these popular forces are key in turning the situation around. For this to happen, what is required is a coherent perspective, strategy, and programme of the long-term, that can deepen organisational, political, and geographic depth, sophistication, sustainability, impact, solidarity, and unity in action. With such a strategy and programme, there can be real opportunities for the re-composition of a progressive broad mass movement, possibilities for the re-emergence of united workplace and community struggles and the potential for these to create a political dynamic that can challenge the ANC's hold over the black working class.

2.2. Economic Factors

The South African economy over the past 25 years have performed below government expectations. Even though the GDP per capita showed a steady growth between 1994 and 2008, including resilience from the 2008 global financial crisis, it has been followed by almost 10 years of stagnation The economy had been limping even before the first case of Covid-19 was reported in South Africa on 5 March 2020. The last two quarters of 2019 so the economic recording negative growth rate which plunged the country into a technical recession.

This has impacted on the rate of unemployment which has been on an upward trajectory since 2018. Unemployment in the Eastern Cape is the highest in the country, 47% (expanded definition) in the second quarter of 2021. The number of employed people decreased by 1,2 million people in South Africa in 2020, with youth unemployment (15–34 years) being recorded at a staggering 61.9%. This poses an existential crisis for the country if not addressed speedily.

The impact of Covid-19 and the slow pace of vaccination coverage point to a slow recovery to the productive capacity required to get the country back on its economic feet. Consequently, projections from the World Bank are that unemployment will continue to increase in the next over the next four years (2022-2026). Currently projection state that many countries, including South Africa, may take up to five years to recover from the impact of the covid-19 pandemic. There is no gainsaying that increases in unemployment worse income inequality. Inequality promotes social instability and unrest. The levels of inequality in South Africa have been further exposed by Covid-19

2.3. Social Factors

The emergence of covid-19 pandemic has shifted the contours of social life permanently. The devasted impact of the disease is yet to be felt given the current restriction which make it difficult for communities to bond and grieve together. The challenges with the vaccination programme and flareups in infections may lead to further pressures on the health care system and result in further restrictions (lockdowns) which will lead to further socio-economic strife. This will have major implications for education and training provision. In addition to this the high levels of social instability have direct impact for the construction sector. There has been a steady increase in service delivery protest according to Municipal IQ (2020), and the decline in 2020 can be attributed to the lockdown restrictions because of the covid-19 pandemic

To understand the challenges facing skills development, it is important to have due regard to the state of early childhood development and basic education in South Africa. This is because it is this foundation that becomes building block toward global competitiveness. The South African Early Childhood Review (2019) paints a picture that should be a source of concern for everyone. For example, according to this report, 31% of children under the age of two are stunted. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), stunting is caused by poor nutrition, repeated infection and inadequate psychosocial stimulation, and results in poor cognition and educational performance and increased risks of nutrition-related chronic diseases in adult life. The Review report further indicates that 82% of poor children under six years receive grants and only 64% of poor children under a year receive government grant. More than a million children aged 3-5 years still do not have access to any form of early learning programme. The report also points to a disturbing situation in which 78% of South African Grade 4 learners were found to be unable to read for meaning in any language, compared to only 4% internationally. These statistics have a direct impact of the basic education system on the country's ability to develop skills needed by the economy. Should this situation continue, it would almost guarantee a continuous challenge skills problem in

the country which will lead to virtuous cycle of poverty particularly for those children currently trapped in this situation

2.4. Technologic Factors

Technological advances present a major dilemma for South Africa, as there are calls to embrace technological advances including migration towards 4IR, there are still calls to apply labour-intensive methods of construction to deal with unemployment and skills crisis currently facing South Africa. Technology affects virtually every economic sector, including the construction sector, as knew technologies are introduced in the construction of new buildings, building material require new set of skills. Many countries in the world have adopted the Building Information Modelling (BMI) technologies to revolutionise the construction process. BMI will require new set of skills from the construction sector and reorientation of existing skills.

2.5. Environmental Factors

The climate debate has moved beyond the narrow confines of an environmental issue towards a broad mainstream economic issues. This is particularly important given the challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment which have now been further exacerbated by the emergence of the covid-19 pandemic and the changing geopolitical economy which has resulted in rise of nationalist leadership in the west. At the global level, the issues that shape climate change discourse are:

- ☑ High debt and urgent need for recovery
- ☑ Deepening systemic & generational poverty and unemployment
- ☑ Population set to double in the next three decades
- ☑ Increasing informalisation of urban and rural economies
- ☑ Large informal economy with internationalized extractive economies
- ☑ Dearth of infrastructure investment
- ☑ Balance climate risk with the need for economic transformation
- ☑ Geopolitical rivalry

The OECD Environmental Performance Reviews (2013) present the following as the major environmental challenges facing South Africa:

- ⇒ One of the most energy- and carbon-intensive economies in the world
- ⇒ An overreliance on natural resources
- ⇒ Poorly regulated mining resulting in serious environmental damage
- ⇒ High pressures on limited water resources.
- ⇒ Poor environmental quality and access to environmental services (sanitation, waste collection and healthy housing) affecting health, especially children.
- ⇒ Increasing illegal poaching, wildlife trade and damage by invasive species.

2.6. Legal Factors

Restitution, redistribution, and security of tenure underpin land reform in South Africa. Section 25(6) of the constitution states, a person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure because of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. The interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) provides a temporary measure to protect land rights of communities living in the former homelands. In addition, there are three landmark cases in recent time which provide a legal basis for the protection of tenure rights of marginalised communities in South Africa.

Maledu and Others v Itereleng Bakgatla Mineral Resources (Pty) Ltd

In this case the Itereleng Bakgatla Mineral Resources obtain mining rights from the Department of Mineral Resources. When the mining company tried to exercise its mining rights, the families who had purchased the land in question, prevented them from doing so. The families argued that IPLRA requires that consent must be obtained before a person who holds rights in terms of the Act can be deprived of those rights. The families argued that the mining rights (in terms of Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act) had the effect of depriving them of their land rights. The Constitutional Court found that rights held in terms of these laws could co-exist and do co-exist. The MPRDA does not trump IPILRA and does not automatically erase rights held in terms of IPILRA. When a mining right holder exercises his mining right by attempting to or beginning mining operations IPILRA rights holders are deprived of their rights and the consent of the directly affected rights holder must be obtained before mining can continue. The Court held that an appropriate process to lawfully deprive people who hold rights in IPILRA exists in the MPRDA in terms of section 54, which deals with the determination of compensation by agreement between the parties or through a court order in the case of people who hold rights in terms of IPILRA – those rights can only lawfully be given up through obtaining the consent of the rights holders & paying compensation.

Baleni v Minister of Mineral Resources

The court followed the precedent set in the *Maledu v Itereleng Bakgatla* Mineral Resources made another ground-breaking determination with regards to people who hold informal land tenure. The question in this judgment concerned whether consent of the directly affected rights holders is required before a mining right is awarded by the DMR over land where people hold rights in terms of customary law and IPILRA. The mining company and department argued that MPRDA does away with the right of a common law owner to refuse mining, this then meant it also took away the right of a customary law owner to refuse mining, even though the MPRDA says nothing about customary law. The court rejected this argument. The court found that the MPRDA did not trump IPILRA and that a community's consent, as required by IPILRA, and not merely consultation with a community, as required by the MPRDA, is necessary before a mining right can be obtained over a community's property

CASAC, RWM & Others v Ingonyama Trust

This case was brought by CASAC, the Rural Women's Movement, and several community members that had been unlawfully induced into converting their customary law ownership property rights to leases with the Ingonyama Trust. The court first dealt with the history, nature, content, and strength of Permission to Occupy (PTO) rights as well as the statutory protections these rights enjoy. PTOs, which were granted to black people on un-surveyed land in designated black rural areas, gave people exclusive and perpetual occupancy and use rights and required no payment of rent. The PTO system was retained in KZN and these laws that retained PTOs continued to apply on land held by the Trust. PTO rights are protected in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution that prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of land. These rights are also protected by section 26(6) of the Constitution that requires previously insecure and unprotected tenure be protected and made secure. By extension of protections given by section 25(6) these rights are also protected by IPILRA – which requires that consent of the rights holders be obtained before being deprived of rights to land. The Court found that by implementing its PTO Conversion policy through requiring holders of PTO rights to convert their PTOs to leases; unlawfully preventing the issuance of new PTOs and requiring people that wanted to apply for new PTOs to instead conclude leases with the Trust, the Trust and Board acted unlawfully and in violation of customary law & applicable legislation and in violation of the Constitution, and ordered the trust to refund money paid by people for residential leases.

3.   A synopsis of the NGO sector in SA

South Africa does not have viable mass organisations that can provide the strategic and political leadership capable of matching formidable challenges facing humanity today. Structurally, we have the old working class that came out of the period of apartheid and led the struggle for liberation (Covid-19 Working Class Campaign, 2019). Up until the onset of the Covid-19 lockdown, this diminishing section enjoyed permanent but precarious employment and has continuously been thrown into the streets, into the ranks of the unemployed (Covid-19 Working Class Campaign, 2019). The second section (the 'post-apartheid working class') is a large and growing section of the unemployed, casual workers, workers who hustle daily at the side of the road, a large part of which is feminised, 'self-employed' and does anything to earn a living (Covid-19 Working Class Campaign, 2019). This section of the working class, led by women as they bear the brunt of social reproduction, forms the bedrock of the survival of the entire working class.

According to the Covid-19 Working Class Campaign (2019), the section of the working class coming out of the anti-apartheid struggle was severely weakened (if not defeated) in the battles against neoliberalism which reached a peak under the Mbeki Presidency. Another important section of the working class is the casualised, unemployed and feminised workers that led the resistance to neoliberalism from the mid-1990s, but it did not lead to the constitution of a new historic moment in working class organisation. The third segment of arise from the second section which began to organise again after Marikana and can be seen

in many continuing protests in the country. While these two sections of the working class share the same social base, their political and organisational experience differs in that the "new social movements" (from Gear to Marikana), developed a broad political consciousness grounded in an anti-neoliberal and anti-globalisation politics (Covid-19 Working Class Campaign, 2019). This is where we stand as we consider how the Covid-19 context presents new questions about working class organisation.

According to the Covid-19 Working Class Campaign, the factory closures, the collapse of whole industries that promised some kind of permanent employment in the private sector, and lastly, the impact of this collapse on state revenues in a neoliberal framework has led the largest number of jobs lost in the shortest period of time since 1994 (some 3 million jobs lost over some 9 months from March 2020). The Covid-19 Working Class Campaign believes that this bloodbath breaks down the social isolation of the anti-apartheid working class from the precarious post-apartheid working class. This is likely to shift the terrain of organising from the factories to the townships: struggles for survival, livelihoods and political change are more likely to be driven from the townships than factories given (Covid-19 Working Class Campaign, 2020). Both progressive and regressive elements of working-class self-organisation in the township already co-exist with their contradictory logics in how the marginalised in South Africa often survive – by occupying land illegally, connecting to electricity illicitly, and entering clientelistic relations with slumlords, political brokers, and even criminal syndicates. Both the progressive and the regressive confirm that even the most marginalised people exercise some degree of individual and collective agency, and this is increasingly outside the factory floor.

Despite thousands of protests and some impressive social movements, South African popular movements are weak. The actions and strategies of popular movements are still shaped in terms of failed promises, and not yet in structural and systemic terms. In other words, the struggles and demands posed these popular movements are not shaped by a rigorous inadequate analysis and understanding of the structural and systemic roots of the social, economic, and political problems faced by the unemployed and workers. They have only inadequately elements of the tools of analysis required.

The second major weakness of most popular movements is the absence of theories and strategies of change beyond winning immediate demands. There is no conscious effort to think about the transition from the immediate to long-term visions of a changed society. There is the absence of a generalised and shared strategy to win immediate demands whilst also pushing the limits of the given framework and fashioning out long-term changes. There is no connection of immediate reforms with systemic transformation. There is generalised absence of anti-systemic transformative logics/alternatives/ 'liberated zones'/'occupied spaces' from below.

The third major weakness is organisational: the thin activist base which the popular movements rely on. There is not a big enough layer with the strategic, political, and programmatic capacity required to mobilise, organise, and win. Most popular formulations

have weak organisational capacity. There is no critical mass of a capacitated activist layer that can carry through and sustain the diverse organisational, political, and programmatic tasks.

These weaknesses are shaped and reproduced by several factors: the disorganising impacts of capitalism and neo-liberalism and the delegation of change to the state means the weakening of self-agency from below. The daily struggles to eke out a living from limited livelihood options impose severe stresses and strains on atomised individuals, families, households, and communities. These do not leave much room for political self-agency. Whilst little understood, the demobilising effects of the emboldened religious and traditionalist outlooks should not be underestimated as they entrench social conservatism and right-wing consciousness. Part of this demobilising dynamic are how the working class is turning on itself as can be seen in xenophobia, tribalism, 'Coloured' vs. 'African' tensions, crime, violence and so on. All of these mean the dispossessed classes are simply not yet a counterpoint from which to challenge the power of capital and the state.

Outside of popular movements, there is a significant sprinkling of powerful organisations with features that combine movement and NGO features. These are normally well-funded organisations with a national profile. They have skilled activists, leaders, and a professional core. They normally focus on a single issue and mobilise around that in effective ways that win defined demands. These NGO-movement hybrids also work alongside similarly well-resourced NGOs. This collaboration has often proved effective in successful litigation, public campaigns, lobbying and advocacy. Their strategy has been based on optimising the progressive rights and transformative mandate in the country's Constitution. This is what the December 2014 Preparatory Assembly of the envisioned when it argued that the UF has "to mobilise for the advancement, deepening and realisation of the progressive and transformative content of the Constitution of the country from below in order that the mass of the oppressed and exploited people may meaningfully and substantively claim their democratic, political, socio-economic and other rights enshrined therein whilst also creating space for informed public debate and progressive review of the Constitution from below". However, it is not clear whether this sub-set of organisations may be able to survive without the resource base they have. They have also been critiqued as having a limited strategy that focuses on a narrow conception of social justice that is seen as insufficiently considering systemic and structural questions of political economy. Linked to this critique is also the critique that this sub-set of organisations do not go beyond immediate reforms. Despite all these critiques, this sub-set of organisations has won important victories, has built a significant social base, and serves as a strong pillar in defence of democratic rights and claiming of constitutional rights. However, their collective impact has not yet been broadened and extended to help build a broader popular movement.

4.   SWOT Analysis

	INTERNAL FACTORS	EXTERNAL FACTORS
POSITIVE	**STRENGHTS** ⇒ Good reputation from peer organisations and the communities wherein we work ⇒ *Bouncebackability* and ability to respond/adapt to challenges faced by communities (make a meaningful contribution) ⇒ Strong team ethic ⇒ Deals with communities' challenges creatively and in collaboration with the communities ⇒ Available to communities who bring their challenges to BRC (e.g., ADM restitution fund litigation) ⇒ Builds capacities of the communities wherein we work ⇒ Institutional memory in documents ⇒ Organisational systems that beef up accountabilities ⇒ Excellent Board of Directors and good governance structures ⇒ Strong organising skills (community organisation) ⇒ We know our communities intimately ⇒ Traditional methods of communication in disseminating information ⇒ Address side struggles like gender–based violence and feminism	**OPPORTUNITIES** ⇒ Activism that can be nurtured by BRC into development champions ⇒ Unlimited opportunities for new rural development programmes ⇒ Developing our own development models ⇒ Great opportunities to saddle between land and developmental issues in collaboration with communities ⇒ Opportunities to document rural people's struggles and indigenous ways of protecting themselves/land and dissemination this work widely ⇒ Expand our models ⇒ Influence government with our past experiences
POSITIVE	**WEAKNESSES** ⇒ Inadequately utilised institutional memory (not scanned in and saved in a cloud) ⇒ Under-utilisation/inadequate relationship management with partners and funders ⇒ Not enough capacity at BRC for expansion ⇒ Project planning needs more work	**THREATS** ⇒ Inadequate project ownership by the communities (especially the youth), thus affecting project sustainability ⇒ Wilful state sabotage and undermining of organisations in the rural developmental space (through corruption, misuse of funds and direct sabotage and unwillingness to engage) ⇒ Funding and being limited to traditional funders

INTERNAL FACTORS	EXTERNAL FACTORS
⇒ Weak monitoring and evaluation towards project sustainability ⇒ Geographically limited to KKH, while actively expanding ⇒ We do not document enough and publishing papers ⇒ Inadequate technological savvy as a team ⇒ BRC Website needs work	⇒ Community internal dynamics that can deter development and BRC projects in some instances ⇒ State of the economy affects the triple challenge ⇒ Increased desperation and poverty stricken and socio-economically unstable context ⇒ Vandalism of the development projects that are existing in the communities ⇒ Covid-19 ⇒ Digital divide is affecting the communities access the internet

5.   Strategy Management Framework

5.1.   Strategic Goals

The following four Strategic Goals will collectively facilitate the realisation of the organisation's mission over the next 6 years:

5.2.   Strategic Objectives

The following strategic objectives support the strategic goals of the organisation in the next 3–6 years.

Strategic Goals	Strategic Objectives
1. To improve rural livelihoods and management of the environment	⊙ Promoting agricultural development through supporting at least 100 small scale farmers and household food production.
	⊙ Increase local economic development opportunities in rural areas.
	⊙ To empower rural communities to manage their national environment.
2. To increase ownership and access to productive land by marginalised communities	⊙ To facilitate the distribution of land to rural communities.
	⊙ To advocate for the settlement of existing claims and lodgement opportunity for betterment claims.
	⊙ To facilitate and advocate for the delivery of basic services to rural communities.

3.	To promote gender equity and empowerment of women	⊙	To reduce incidences of gender-based violence and femicide
		⊙	To empower women and girl children
		⊙	To address patriarchy and toxic masculinity
4.	To build resilient a human rights movement and rural activism	⊙	To build a new layer of leadership to advance and lead rural struggles
		⊙	To strengthen democratic systems and participation of young in rural communities

5.3. Development Approach

Our development approach is informed by our understanding of the developmental challenges facing rural communities in an environment of dwindling financial support to the NGO sector. BRC's work will be underpinned by the following developmental principles:

MOBILISATION

BRC uses its experience and track record to mobilise rural communities to articulate their own issues and develop own solutions

EMPOWERMENT

We understand that to improve human condition begins by improving the capacity of communities to do things for themselves.

RESEARCH

We subscribe to evidence-based policy making and development. Research & Evaluation provide the sound basis for social betterment

PARTNERSHIPS

We work with strategic alliances and progressive forces to leverage additional capacity which will enable us to have greater impact in our work

ASSET BUILDING

BRC promotes community ownership and control of resources. When communities' own assets, they protect and maintain them. It restores their pride and dignity

5.4. KPIs, Initiatives and Targets

Strategic Goals		Strategic Objectives		Key Performance Indicators		6-Year Target
1. To improve rural livelihoods and management of the environment	1.1.	Promoting agricultural development through supporting small scale farmers and household food production	1.1.1.	Number of small-scale farmers trained	100
			1.1.2.	Hectares of fields cultivated per crop	½
			1.1.3.	Yields per hectare per crop of planted fields	80%
			1.1.4.	Kg of crops for household consumption	Per crop
	1.2.	Increase local economic development opportunities in rural areas	1.2.1.	Number of small-scale farmers operating profitable businesses	60
			1.2.2.	Average rand value of monthly income generated	5000
			1.2.3.	Number of jobs created	120
	1.3.	To empower rural communities to manage their natural environment	1.3.1.	Hectares of catchment cleared.	1200
			1.3.2.	Number of workers with knowledge about environmental conservation	150
			1.3.3.	Number of households practising environmentally friendly approaches	80
2. To increase ownership and access to productive land by marginalised communities	2.1.	To facilitate the distribution and ownership of land to rural communities	2.1.1.	Number of household with successfully lodged claims	200
			2.1.2.	Research output focusing on rural development	2
	2.2.	To advocate for the settlement of existing claims and lodgement opportunity for betterment claims	2.2.1.	Number of claimant compensated	300
			2.2.2.	Number of community development project implemented	50
	2.3.	To facilitate and advocate for the delivery of basic services and development of rural communities	2.3.1.	Number of community members participating in integrated municipal planning	250
			2.3.2.	Number of development initiatives arising from community participation	10
			3.1.1.	% reduction in incidences of GBVF	5%

Strategic Goals			Strategic Objectives			Key Performance Indicators	6-Year Target
3.	To promote gender equality and empowerment of women	3.1.	To reduce incidences of gender-based violence and femicide	3.1.2.	Number of GBVF survivors assisted with opening criminal cases	50
				3.1.3.	Number of cases successfully prosecuted	25
		3.2.	To empower women and girl children to act on their rights and for their economic emancipation.	3.2.1.	Number of survivors reporting abuse to law enforcement agencies	80
				3.2.2.	Number of women participating in leadership of community structures	100
				3.2.3.	Number of women operating profitable business ventures	30
				3.2.4.	Number of young girls participating in development programmes	40
		3.3.	To fight patriarchy and toxic masculinity	3.3.1.	Number of youth Boys/Men participating in awareness workshop	350
				3.3.2.	Number of community campaigns reaching 100 or more community members	3
				3.3.3.	Number of young people acting champions against GBVF	30
4.	To build resilient a human rights movement and rural activism	4.1.	To build a new layer of leadership to advance and lead rural struggles	4.1.1.	Number of young people completed the leadership development programme	40
				4.1.2.	Number of campaigns highlighting rural struggles	2
				4.1.3.	Number of young people in leadership positions in their communities	50
		4.2.	To strengthen democratic systems and participation of young in rural communities	4.2.1.	Number of development projects initiated by young people	20
				4.2.2.	Number of young people participating in municipal IDP processes	70
				4.2.3.	Number of young people that are activists in their communities	35

5. Programme Theories of Change

5.1. Land Rights and Restitution Programme

Figure 1: ToC for the Land rights and restitution programme

Narrative version of the TOC

IF communities who were displaced by the Betterment Planning policy of the pre-1994 governments are allowed successfully lobby for the reopening of restitution claims **AND** government set aside sufficient financial resources towards the restitution of these claims, and affected communities participate in the re-lodgement process, **AND** the affected communities and government reach a settlement agreement on all submitted claims **AND** communities agree on the how they are going to derive socio-economic value from the settlement **AND** these development plan are integrated into provincial and local government plans, **THEN** this will lead to improve quality of life of the rural communities in the Eastern Cape.

5.2. Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Programme

Figure 2:ToC for Support to small-scale farmers and household gardens programme

## 5.3. Women Empowerment & The Fight Against Gender-based Violence Proramme

Figure 3: ToC for Fight Against Gender-based Violence and Women Empowerment

Narrative version of the ToC

IF GBV Programme targets Boys and Men with awareness campaigns and training that educates them about the negative effects of patriarchy on society AND actively participate in awareness raising campaigns and other educational programme. IF communities are involved in dialogues focused on responsible drinking and the dangers of substance abuse AND encourage Boys and Men to participate and lead the efforts to fight gender-based violence and femicide, this will lead to Boys and Men taking action to prevent GBVF and report cases to law enforcement agencies. IF communities establish community forums and use these to conduct training and local youth participate in sports and other educational, motivational entertainment AND are provided with opportunities for training and skills development, THEN there will be a positive change in behaviour and attitude of Boys and Men against women and other vulnerable groups which will lead to women and girl children safe from violence and abuse

## 5.4.   Sustainable Environment and Natural Resources Programme

Figure 4: TOC for the Environmental and natural resources programme

6.   Risk Management

Our approach to risk mapping is informed by the internal organisational analysis undertaken through the SWOT analysis. We used the weaknesses identified in the SWOT to identify operational risks and threats to identify strategic risks. In addition to this we then look at the strategic goals to assess whether there are any other operational and strategic risks that may not have captured through the weaknesses and threats and include those in the Risk Management Matrix. The Strategic and Operational Risks and mitigation measures are included in Appendix B.

7.   References

Knoema (2021) Unemployment Forecast 2019-2024, Data and Charts. Retrieved from https://knoema.com/vwkvxbe/south-africa-unemployment-forecast-2019-2024-data-and-charts

Hall K, Sambu W, Almeleh C, Mabaso K, Giese S and Proudlock P (2019) South African Early Childhood Review 2019. Cape Town: Children's Institute, University of Cape Town and Ilifa Labantwana

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APPENDIX A: Risk Management Matrix

Risk Class	Risk Event	Potential adverse effect	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level	Risk Management Strategy	Person Responsible
Strategic Risks	⊙ Damage to community infrastructure because of service delivery related protests	The projects can be implemented. Projects are damaged and resources are lost	M	H	5	When introducing the project to the community ensures that the community understands the benefits of the project and there is buy in from all sectors in the community. Provide education on the value of the assets and transfer ownership.	Managing Director Project manager and field officers
	⊙ Intra-community conflict which prevents or delay community development projects						
	⊙ Increased levels of corruption in the state	Government spending not utilized for the impact it was intended	M	H	4	Training of activists at community level to monitor state spending in their area. Building social movement strong to challenge government and defend democracy. Ensure public accountability through community mobilisation.	Project leader and field officers, Managing director and relevant organisations
	⊙ Decrease in donor support	Decreased funding to implement projects	M	H	4	To have a diverse funding base and ensure excellent accountability to existing donors. Update the existing funding plan. Register BRC as section 18A company to assess funding from private sector.	Managing director, resource mobilisation manager and finance manager

Risk Class	Risk Event	Potential adverse effect	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level	Risk Management Strategy	Person Responsible
	⊙ Resurgence of covid-19 or discovery of vaccine resistant strain	Community engagement is reduced.	M	H	4	Make use of technology where possible. Follow Covid-19 protocols. Adjustment of plan to accommodate the context of Covid 19.	Project manager , field officer, Managing Director
	⊙ Poor project management, monitoring and reporting on projects	The project is unsuccessful, or the success is not covered.	L	H	4	Ensure that the BRC project management and monitoring and reporting systems are implemented. Project team meetings, monthly plans, and monthly supervision meetings.	Project Manager, field officers and Managing director
	⊙ Fraud and Corruption	Funds are lost and donors withdraw their funding	L	H	4	Ensure that all the BRC systems and controls are implemented. Annual audits are conducted. Monthly financial reports presented to Management committee and circulated to the board prior board meetings. Conduct of annual audits.	Board , Director, and finance manager / management committee
	⊙ Loss of project information as results of a disaster	History of BRC is lost	L	M	3	Ensure that all BRC data is backed up externally. Introduce electronic filing to support the existing filing. Less paper filing and frequent backups.	Field officers, office administrator, project manager.

Risk Class	Risk Event	Potential adverse effect	Likelihood	Impact	Risk Level	Risk Management Strategy	Person Responsible
Institutional and management risks	⊙ Lack of effective oversight by the Board of Directors.	Good governance is not implemented, and donor withdraw their funding.	L	H	3	Ensure the board is operational and plays a vital role in The governance of BRC. Appoint of board members with capacity and available time.	Managing Director
	⊙ Poor adherence to legislation, regulations, and internal policies	Could lead to misuse of funds and criminal charges and fines. (Legislation) Donors do not want to support BRC	L	H	3	BRC has systems to ensure that policies and legislation are adhered to. Use of audit management reports.	Finance manager and Managing Director
	⊙ Lack of technology skills	BRC is not able to compete in the donor space for funding	M	M	3	BRC implements the latest technology. Staff up skilling and introduction of relevant technology based on assessment.	Project Manager , Managing Director

KEY

LIKELIHOOD	L = Low	M = Medium	H = High
IMPACT	L = Low	M = Medium	H = High

Risk Level

1 = Low	4= Moderately High
2 = Moderately Low	5 = Extreme
3= Medium	